















Once poor, always poor?  
Do initial conditions matter?  







The paper analyzes the effects of individual and household characteristics on current 
poverty  status,  while  controlling  for  initial  conditions,  past  poverty  status  and 
unobserved heterogeneity in 14 European Countries for the period 1994 2000, using the 
European Community Household Panel. The distinction between true state dependence 
and individual heterogeneity has very important policy implications, since if the former 
is the main cause of poverty it is of paramount importance to break the “vicious circle” 
of poverty using income supporting social policies, whereas if it is the latter anti poverty 
policies should focus primarily on education, training, development of personal skills 
and other labour market oriented policies. The empirical results are similar in qualitative 
but rather different in quantitative terms across EU countries. State dependence remains 
significant in all specifications, even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity or 
when removing possible endogeneity bias.  
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In  recent  years,  issues  of  state  dependence  feature  prominently  in  poverty 
dynamics research. The main hypothesis tested in this research is whether past poverty 
experiences determine current poverty status. This may happen, for instance, because 
poverty  spells  might  result  in  depreciation  of  human  capital  and  employment  skills, 
causing  low pay  or  unemployment  spells  and,  finally,  increasing  the  duration  or  the 
frequency of poverty spells (poverty reoccurrence). If the long run policy objective is to 
keep poverty rates low and state dependence is ‘genuine’, then it is important to bring 
individuals out of poverty using social benefits in the short run. Nevertheless, the state 
dependence usually observed in dynamic panel data models may also be attributed to 
sorting  effects,  in  the  sense  that  the  individuals  that  escape  poverty  may  possess 
particular  observed  (e.g.  age,  educational  qualifications,  etc)  or  unobserved 
characteristics (willingness to escape poverty, cleverness, social networks, life attitudes, 
etc)  and,  thus,  differ  in  a  systematic  way  from  the  individuals  that  remain  poor. 
Consequently, when examining state dependence it is important to control for observed 
as  well  as  unobserved  heterogeneity.  Further,  a  positive  result  in  terms  of  state 
dependence may also be due to the fact that individuals with a higher tendency to remain 
permanently poor may be over represented in the sample. Therefore, in the case of state 
dependence, controlling for the observed and unobserved determinants of initial poverty 
status (initial conditions) is also important. 
 
In the current paper, we follow the methodology of Wooldridge (2005), which 
proposes  a  solution  that  handles  simultaneously  the  problems  of  endogeneity  of  the 
initial  conditions  and  unobserved  heterogeneity.  He  suggests  using  a  joint  density 
distribution  conditional  on  the  strictly  exogenous  variables  and  the  initial  condition, 
instead of attempting to obtain the joint distribution of all outcomes of the endogenous 
variables.  In  this  analysis,  a  multivariate  random  effects  logit  estimation  has  been 
employed for the analysis of poverty state dependence in 14 EU Member States during 
the  period  1994 2000  using  the  data  of  the  European  Community  Household  Panel 
(ECHP). 
 
In  the  next  two  sections,  the  issues  of  unobserved  heterogeneity  and  initial 
conditions  are  discussed  drawing  evidence  from  previous  studies  in  poverty, 
employment and low pay dynamics. The ECHP is briefly presented in section 4 along 
with  household  income  and  poverty  definitions.  Section  5,  presents  the  model  to  be 
applied. The last two sections report the empirical results and the conclusions of our 
analysis, along with some policy implications. 
 
 
2. TRUE STATE DEPENDENCE VERSUS UNOBSERVED 
HETEROGENEITY 
True state dependence means that the experience of poverty in one year per se 
raises  the  risk  of  being  poor  in  the  next  year  (Heckman  1981a).  However,  since 
individuals with “favourable” characteristics are likely to leave poverty earlier, the state 
or duration dependence observed in data may not be genuine. Therefore it is important 3 
 




In recent years, researchers focus on the distinction between true state dependence 
and individual heterogeneity. This distinction has very important policy implications. For 
instance,  if  true  state  dependence  is  indeed  significant  compared  to  individual 
heterogeneity, then it is important to break the “vicious circle” of poverty and try, even at 
high  cost,  to  bring  individuals  out  of  poverty  using  income support  policies  such  as 
social  benefits.  On  the  contrary,  if  individual  heterogeneity  defines  the  duration  of 
poverty,  anti poverty  policies  should  focus  on  other  schemes  such  as  education, 
development of personal skills and capacities or other labour market and social policies.  
 
Most studies find that poverty state dependence remains significant even when 
controlling  for  unobserved  heterogeneity.  Canto  (1996)  examines  the  duration 
dependence for poverty entries and exits in Spain using a non parametric specification 
for the hazard rate. She controls for unobserved heterogeneity indirectly by testing the 
homogeneity of the hazard rate between groups that are likely to have different spell 
lengths. She finds significant duration dependence both for poverty re entries and exits. 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) using data from the BHPS for the 1990s conclude that 
there is substantial state dependence in poverty, separately from the persistence caused 
by heterogeneity. Poggi (2007) studies social exclusion dynamics in Spain and also finds 
that both individual heterogeneity and true state dependence are related to the probability 
of experiencing social exclusion. Biewen (2006) reports that even after controlling for 
observed and unobserved individual characteristics, there is negative state dependence in 
poverty exit and re entry behaviour. He also calculates that 6% of the German population 
has unobserved characteristics that lead to low poverty exit and high re entry rates, thus 
making these individuals possible candidates for chronic poverty. According to Ayllón 
(2008), in Spain more than 50% of aggregate state dependence in poverty status is due to 
past  poverty  experiences.  Finally,  when  focusing  on  youth  poverty,  while  separating 
genuine  state  dependence  in  the  poverty  status  from  observed  and  unobserved 
characteristics, Ayllon (2009) concludes that there is a substantial proportion of genuine 
state dependence in the poverty status. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  Giraldo  et  al.  (2002)  stress  that  there  are  two  sources  of 
unobserved heterogeneity related to the study of poverty: first, the ability of household 
members to obtain income in a specific period and, second, the way in which this ability 
evolves over time. When allowing for time variant unobserved heterogeneity, the authors 
                                                 
1 State and duration dependence are often used in the literature are synonyms. However, state dependence 
determines how the probability to be poor in the current period depends on whether the individual was poor 
in the previous period, while duration dependence indicates how the probability to be poor in the current 
period depends on the duration spent in the poverty spell. This means that when duration dependence is 
examined, more than one lagged values of the dependent variable are used in the regression, or when 
poverty exits or re entries are examined (instead of poverty status per se), more than one period dummies 
are  included  in  the  hazard  function.  This  paper  focuses  on  state  dependence  rather  than  duration 
dependence. Further, since the paper focuses on the effect on time on poverty status per se, the literature of 
poverty  entries  and  exits  is  not  presented  explicitly  (see,  for  example,  Jenkins  (1995;  2000),  Stevens 
(1999), Antolin et al. (1999), Muffels (2000), Oxley et al. (2000), OECD (2001), Jenkins et al. (2001), 
Canto (2002, 2003), Devicienti (2002; 2010), Finnie and Sweetman (2003), Fouarge and Layte (2005) and 
Callens and Croux (2009)). A literature review covering these papers as well as an analysis of poverty 
transitions in Europe using discrete time proprotional hazard rate models with the ECHP data is presented 
in Andriopoulou (2009: ch. VI, VII) and Andriopoulou and Tsakloglou (2011). 
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do not find any sign of true state dependence in their analysis of persistent poverty in 
Italy. This finding reinforces the theory of incentives of the poor which may vary not 
only among individuals but also with time. As underlined by Aassve et al. (2006), there 
is also another issue on whether it is poverty experience or low income experience that 
really affects individuals with regards to the duration dependence. Poverty spells are not 
like  unemployment  spells,  during  which  the  individual  is  completely  aware  of  the 
situation  and,  hence,  his  choices  and  preferences  might  be  affected  by  his  position. 
Studies that focus on low pay instead of poverty (Stewart and Swaffield 1999; Cappellari 
2004; Stewart 2007)
2 show that the probability of being low paid depends strongly on 
low pay in the previous year. In the same line, Finnie and Gray (2002), when examining 
individual mobility across earning quintiles, conclude that the probability of having an 
upward or downward transition depends negatively on the time that an individual has 
spent in a given quintile and this negative duration dependence remains significant when 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Likewise, Weber (2002) verifies that there is 
significant state dependence for women at the lower part of the distribution in Austria.  
 
It should be noted that Cockx and Dejemeppe (2005) assert that the observed 
negative duration dependence in the exit rate very often turns out to be spurious, at least 
in  unemployment  studies.  Nevertheless,  Caliendo  and  Uhlendorff  (2008)  analyze  the 
mobility  between  self employment,  wage  employment  and  non employment  and  find 
strong  true  state  dependence  in  all  three  states.  With  regards  to  the  labour  force 
participation,  Hyslop  (1999)  shows  that  participation  decisions  for  women  are 
characterized by significant state dependence, unobserved heterogeneity and feedback 
effects from fertility to participation decisions and vice versa. 
 
 
3. THE INITIAL CONDITIONS PROBLEM 
The  initial  conditions  problem,  developed  by  Heckman  (1981b),  in  terms  of 
transitions analysis, can be summarised to the fact that those who are poor in the first 
year  of  the  survey  may  be  a  non random  sample  of  the  population.  Specifically,  a 
positive result in terms of state dependence may be due to the fact that individuals with a 
higher  tendency  to  remain  permanently  poor  may  be  over represented  in  the  sample 
(Cappellari  and  Jenkins  2004;  2008).  Therefore,  in  the  case  of  state  dependence, 
controlling  for  the  observed  and  unobserved  determinants  of  initial  poverty  status  is 
important. 
 
In practice, the problem arises because the start of the observation period does not 
concise with the start of the stochastic process that has generated the poverty or non 
poverty  experiences.  Arulampalam  et  al.  (2000)  emphasize  that  even  if  the  model 
controls  for  unobserved  heterogeneity,  in  order  to  disentangle  the  effect  of  state 
dependence from unobserved heterogeneity, the initial conditions need to be modelled 
instead  of  assumed  as  exogenously  given,  because  the  initial  conditions  may  be 
correlated with the unobservables. 
 
The  problem  of  initial  conditions  has  been  tackled  more  extensively  in  the 
literature  of  unemployment  dynamics.  Arulampalam  et  al.  (2000)  examine 
unemployment dynamics for men using the BHPS and introduce the econometric issues 
                                                 
2  Stewart  (2007)  focuses  more  on  how  past  low pay  employment  affects  the  probability  of  being 
unemployed in the future using a similar methodology as when state dependence is examined. 5 
 
concerning  dynamic  panel  data  models:  unobserved  heterogeneity  (based  on 
Chamberlain 1984), state dependence (based on Heckman 1981a, 1981c) and the initial 
conditions  problem  (based  on  Heckman  1981b).  Even  when  controlling  for  initial 
conditions and unobserved heterogeneity, they find that there is strong state dependence 
especially for older unemployed individuals that may be attributed to depreciation of 
human  capital,  signalling  (in  the  sense  that  past  unemployment  spells  signal  the 
capacities  or  productivity  of  individuals  to  potential  employers)  and  to  the  fact  that 
unemployed individuals may  accept low quality  jobs and this may lead to enterprise 
closure and future unemployment spells. Arulampalam (2002) extents this work further 
in various directions, using different definitions of unemployment. 
 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) use a first order Markov model in order to study 
poverty transitions
3. The great virtue of this model, which is a complement to hazard and 
covariance structure models, is that it allows controlling for initial conditions effects. In 
addition, these models control for potential non random sample retention (for individuals 
that do no attrite and for whom income is observed for at least two consecutive periods). 
Ayllón  (2008)  examines  poverty  transitions  in  Spain  using  the  model  proposed  by 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2004). She finds that unobserved heterogeneity affecting poverty 
status in the base year as well as sample attrition, are exogenous to unobservables related 
to poverty transitions (although her results are sensitive to the selection of the poverty 
line).  Models  that  control  for  initial  conditions  are  also  used  in  studies  of  earnings 
mobility (Stewart and Swaffield 1999; Cappellari 2004; Cappellari and Jenkins 2008). 
 
The methodology that we use in this paper in order to control for initial conditions 
is based on Wooldridge (2005),  which proposes a solution to handle the problem of 
endogeneity of the initial conditions, while controlling for unobserved. He suggests using 
a joint density distribution conditional on the strictly exogenous variables and the initial 
condition, instead of attempting to obtain the joint distribution of all outcomes of the 
endogenous variables (Hsiao 1986). For the binary response models of probit and logit 
form, the main advantage of this method is that it can be applied easily using standard 
random effects software. Yet, the explanatory variables included in the model must be 
strictly exogenous and at most one lag
4 of the dependent variable can be used in the 
estimation. Another restriction of the model is that it can be applied only to balanced 
panel data. This reduction from unbalanced to balanced panel data can always result in 
discarding useful information. An application of this methodology to social exclusion can 
be found in Poggi (2007). 
 
 
4. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HOUSEHOLD PANEL AND 
DEFINITIONS 
The  empirical  research  of  the  paper  is  based  on  the  data  of  the  European 
Community  Household  Panel  (ECHP).  The  ECHP  is  a  harmonized  cross national 
longitudinal  survey,  focusing  on  income  and  living  conditions  of  households  and 
individuals  in  the  European  Union.  Due  to  its  multidimensional  nature,  the  ECHP 
provides  information  at  micro level  across  countries  and  across  time  on:  income, 
                                                 
3 Schluter (1997) also uses a Markov model with exogenous variables in order to study the German income 
mobility, with some extensions to poverty dynamics. 
4 D' Addio and Honore (2002) claim that the probability of exiting poverty may depend not only on the 
poverty status of the last period, but on the poverty status in the two most recent periods and they model 
second order state dependence, while controlling time–varying explanatory variables. 6 
 
employment,  health,  education,  housing,  migration,  social  transfers  and  social 
participation, as well as demographics. In other words, as Eurostat describes it, ECHP 
offers data on EU social dynamics (Eurostat 2003). The duration of the survey is eight 
years; thus, the ECHP consists of eight waves, one for each year, from 1994 to 2001.  
The ECHP covers all the 15 Member States of the EU in that period, but not all countries 
have participated in all waves.  In addition some Member States, such as the UK and 
Germany, used data from existing panel surveys and converted them to ECHP format. In 
the current paper, we use all eight waves of the ECHP for 14 EU Member States
5. 
 
Most of the income components in the ECHP have an annual time frame of the 
calendar year preceding the interview. In all the ECHP countries, apart from the UK, the 
calendar  year  coincides  with  the  tax  year,  which  is  the  reference  period  for  income 
components. Although, in this way income comparability is ensured, other variables like 
the household composition variables, the economic activity status etc. refer to the time of 
interview  and  might  not  relate  well  to  income  measured  over  a  period  up  to  twelve 
months in the past (Eurostat 2001). This is particularly undesirable for poverty dynamic 
analysis that tries to identify changes in income components and also uses the lagged 
poverty  status  as  an  explanatory  variable.  Therefore,  for  the  needs  of  the  dynamic 
analysis that follows, we have reconstructed the household income, transferring all the 
income components one year back.
6 
 
Following the practice of Eurostat, the poverty line used in the paper is set at 60% 
of the national median equivalised household income per capita, as it has been calculated 
using the modified OECD scale which assigns 1 to the first adult, 0.5 to the remaing 
adults and 0.3 to children. 
 
 
5. THE MODEL AND ECONOMETRIC DETAILS OF THE ANALYSIS 
The main difference of the model used in this paper from a typical hazard model 
examining state dependence is that the dependent variable is the poverty status per se 
(whether someone is poor or non poor) and not a variable signalling the poverty entry or 
exit. Moreover, state dependence is not captured with time dummies, but with the lagged 
value of the dependent variable. According to Wooldridge (2005, p. 42), only one lag of 
the dependent variable can be used when controlling for initial conditions. Nevertheless, 
this  means  that  we  cannot  measure  duration  dependence,  how  much  the  chances  of 
exiting  poverty  fall  the  longer  one  is  in  poverty.
7  Initial  conditions  are  captured  by 
introducing in the regression the value of the dependent variable in the first period. In 
this  way,  the  assumption  of  exogeneity  of  all  the  explanatory  variables  is  a  strong 
assumption and, therefore, is tested at the end of the analysis.  
 
                                                 
5 For Sweden only cross sectional data are available and, therefore, Sweden has been excluded from the 
analysis. Moreover, the panels of Austria, Finland and Luxembourg are shorter than those of the other 
countries. 
6 It should be underlined that we do not simply lag one wave back the total net household income, but we 
take  into  account  the  different  composition  that  each  household  might  had  in  the  previous  have.  The 
methodology developed for the reconstruction of household income follows the logic of Eurostat’s (2003a) 
construction of household income variable and is similar to the one applied by Debels and Vandecasteele  
(2008).The algorithm for the reconstruction of household income is available from the authors on request. 
7 This effect can only be captured when modelling poverty exit with hazard functions using time dummies 
so as to capture the increasing effect of state dependence year by year.  7 
 
More specifically for a random individual in the population and t=1, 2, … T, the 
conditional probability that poverty occurs is: 
, 1 0 , 1 ( 1| ,..., , , ) ( ) it i t i i i it i t i P y y y z c z y c γ ρ − − = = Φ + +  (1) 
Where  it y is  the  dependent  variable  or  the  poverty  state  of  the  individual  iat 
period t (when  1 it y =  the individual is poor in period t and when  0 it y = the individual 
is non poor),  ( ) x Φ  is the logistic function  exp( )





Φ = = Λ
+
, which is between zero 
and one for all real numbers  x , γ and  ρ are the parameters to be estimated,  i z  and  it z  
are the vectors of time constant and time varying explanatory variables and  i c  is the 
unobserved effect.  ρ  is the coefficient of the lag value of the explanatory variable and 
the indicator of state dependence. If  0 ρ >  being poor (non poor) at  1 t − increases the 
chances of being poor (non poor) at t. 
 
There are three main assumptions related to equation (1). First, the dynamics are 
first order, once  it z  and  i c  are also conditioned on. Second, the unobserved effect is 
additive inside the st.andard normal cumulative distribution function  ( ) x Φ . Third, all 




By assuming that the unobserved effect follows a normal distribution given the 
initial poverty condition  0 i y and the time constant explanatory variables i z : 
2
0 0 1 0 2 | , ( , ) i i i i i c y z Normal a a y a z α σ ≈ + +  (2) 
the parameters of equation (1) can be consistently estimated.  1 a  offers information about 
the  relationship  between  the  unobserved  effect  and  initial  poverty  status,  while 
2
α σ  
indicates  the  dispersion  accounted  by  unobserved  heterogeneity.  According  to 
(Wooldridge 2005, p. 46), the density functions resulting from equations (1) and (2) 
1
i0 t 1 1 ( , ..., |  y , , ; γ, ρ) = Π { ( ) [1 ( )] }
yt yt
it iT i i it it i it it i f y y z c z y c z y c γ ρ γ ρ
−
− − Φ + + ⋅ − Φ + +  




The above estimation can be applied only to balanced panels. Therefore, there is a 
loss of information by dropping individuals that are not present in all seven waves,
10 
while selection and attrition problems might also be present. Nevertheless, the loss of 
information is compensated by the fact that Wooldridge’s methodology allows selection 
and attrition to depend on initial conditions. Specifically, individuals with different initial 
poverty  status  are  allowed  to  have  different  missing  data  probabilities.  In  this  way, 
attrition  is  controlled  for  without  being  explicitly  modelled  as  a  function  of  initial 
conditions  (Wooldridge  2005;  Poggi  2007).  Moreover,  since  we  control  for  initial 
conditions, we do not restrict the sample to an inflow sample and we also include in our 
                                                 
8 For a framework for estimating dynamic, unobserved effects panel data models with possible feedback to 
future explanatory variables, see Wooldridge (2000). 
9  For  the  use  of  fixed  effects  when  controlling  for  initial  conditions  in  a  different  methodological 
framework see Hahn (1999). For a full discussion of the advantages of random effects versus fixed effects 
see Honore and Kyriazidou (2000) and Honore (2002).  
10 Six for Austria and Luxembourg and five for Finland. 8 
 
analysis all the left censored cases that we would have to exclude if a typical hazard 
analysis was used.  
 
As in most poverty studies, since the equivalised household income per capita is 
used for the calculation of poverty status, it is indirectly assumed that the household 
members  pool  their  income  sources.    Therefore,  only  personal  characteristics  of  the 
household head are considered as regressors and not the personal characteristics of the 
household members (e.g. only the age of the household head is taken into account and 
not the age of each household member). Consequently, members of the same household 
have the same poverty determinants and, thus, the same poverty status. Since the panel 
includes repeated observations from the same individual and from the same family, the 
problem of possible violation of the homoskedasticity assumption is present. As a result, 
we  use  the  “robust”  or  ”sandwich”  estimators  for  the  standard  errors,  which  allow 
observations to be dependent within cluster, although they must be independent between 
clusters. The results reported in the following tables have been calculated without the use 




6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: ANALYSIS OF STATE DEPENDENCE 
CONTROLLING FOR INITIAL CONDITIONS 
We develop four specifications using the dynamic logit model presented in the 
previous section. The first specification includes only the initial conditions dummy and 
the lagged value of the poverty status. In the second specification, variables controlling 
for  the  household  and  household  head  characteristics  are  included  in  the  regression 
analysis, as well as wave dummies aiming to control for business cycles effects. In the 
third specification, a number of variables that may cause endogeneity bias are removed 
from the analysis, while in the fourth specification, the role of household type dummies 
is examined in detail. In order to facilitate comparisons across countries, the probability 
of the baseline group is reported on the top of each table.  
 
Table 1 reports the results for the first specification. Both the marginal effects for 
the lagged poverty status and initial status are positive and significant at the 0.1% level in 
all 14 Member States, implying that being poor in the initial or previous year increases 
the hazard of being poor in the current  year.  In most countries the initial conditions 
variable  gives  much  higher  marginal  effects  than  the  lag  poverty  status  with  the 
exception of Finland, the Netherlands and the UK, where the differences are small or go 
to the opposite direction, meaning that poverty reoccurrence is also an important issue. 
Specifically, the marginal effects for the initial conditions variable ranges from 11.3 to 
38.6 in Greece, while in terms of absolute probability (the sum of the marginal effect and 
the  baseline  probability)  ranges  from  13.1  in  the  Netherlands  to  43.7  in  Greece.  As 
suggested  by  the  standard  deviation  of  the  heterogeneity  variance,  σα,,  unobserved 
heterogeneity is large. Also, the likelihood ratio test for rho
12 suggests that unobserved 
heterogeneity is statistically significant in all countries.  
 
                                                 
11 In the tables of the paper, the  marginal effects are  multiplied by 100 (thus, reported as percentage 
changes from the baseline). 
12  rho  is  the  ratio  of  the  heterogeneity  variance  to  one  plus  the  heterogeneity  variance 
2
2






= and,  in  a  way,  indicates  how  much  of  the  model  variance  is  due  to  unobserved 
heterogeneity.  9 
 
In  the  second  specification  (Table  2),  we  include  variables  capturing  certain 
characteristics of the household and the household head so as to control for the observed 
heterogeneity across individuals. Moreover, we add wave dummies in order to control for 
possible  business  cycle  effects,  especially  for  the  time varying  variables  such  as  the 
employment dummies. The baseline group consists of individuals that were not poor in 
the initial and previous year and live in a household with a male household head, aged 
30 64, who has completed secondary education, is employed full time and is a citizen of 
the country under examination. There are no dependent children
13 in the household, none 
of the household members is unemployed and none of the household members has severe 
disability  or  chronic  disease.  The  probability  of  being  poor  while  belonging  to  the 
baseline group is around 1% to 2% in all countries with the exception of the Netherlands 
(3.7%). The fact that there are no large differences in the baseline probability across 
countries,  means  that  the  choice  of  the  baseline  group  is  successful  in  facilitating 
comparisons across countries. 
 
As  expected,  the  effect  of  past  poverty  experiences  declines  in  almost  all 
countries in comparison to the first specification, when the household and the household 
head variables are added in the regression. The absolute decrease in the marginal effects 
corresponding to the effect of initial conditions is larger than the decrease in the marginal 
effects of lagged poverty status. This is expected since the socioeconomic variables that 
are included in the regression may also, in a way, determine whether someone is poor in 
the first place. 
 
Living in a household with a head aged less than 30 or more than 64 increases the 
hazard  of  being  poor  in  all  countries.  The  effect  is  very  strong  for  young  headed 
households in Finland (5.5), the Netherlands (5.5.) and Denmark (4.6) as compared to the 
baseline group. Households headed by elderly individuals have a higher risk to be in 
poverty in 8 out of 14 countries and the highest marginal effect appears in Denmark (1.7) 
and Greece (1.2). Netherlands and France are the only countries where the chance to be 
in poverty decreases significantly for individuals living in households with heads aged 
above  64,  as  compared  to  the  baseline  group.  The  vulnerability  of  female headed 
households to poverty is not evident in all countries. In Finland (0.8), France (0.4) and 
Germany  (0.3)  and  Italy  (0.2)  the  marginal  effect  is  significantly  positive,  but  only 
marginally above zero. On the contrary, in Portugal, living in a female headed household 
ceteris paribus leads to a small but statistically significant decline in the probability of 
being poor (0.2).  
 
The level of education  of the household head  also plays an important role in 
determining the chances of being in poverty at a particular point in time. Living in a 
household with a household head who has completed higher education sharply decreases 
the chances of being poor, while household heads with primary education increase the 
odds  of  being  in  poverty  vis a vis  the  control  group  in  all  countries  apart  from  the 
Netherlands.  As  expected,  unemployment  and  inactivity  of  the  household  head  also 
increase the probability of poverty. The effect of unemployment is particularly strong in 
Ireland  (11.4),  the  Netherlands  (10.9),  Belgium  (9.7)  and  the  UK  (6.0)  and  that  of 
inactivity in the Netherlands (7.4), Denmark (5.9), Ireland (5.1), Finland (4.1) and the 
UK (4.1). The effect of citizenship of the household head is mixed across EU Member 
                                                 
13 The ECHP defines as “dependent children” the individuals who are aged less than 16 or 16 24 who live 
in the parental household and are economically inactive. 10 
 
States with a tendency to increase the probability of being poor both for the EU and the 
non EU citizenship whenever the effect is significant. The highest risk of being poor 
while living in a household with an immigrant household head is observed in Finland; 
especially  when  the  household  head  has  a  non EU  citizenship.  The  Netherlands  and 
Belgium are the only countries where living in a household headed by an immigrant 
(with an EU citizenship in the first case and a non EU citizenship in the second) seems to 
decrease the chances of being poor. Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted with 




In all countries, the presence of dependent children in the household increases the 
chances  of  being  poor  with  the  exception  of  Denmark,  where  the  effect  is  not 
significant.
15 The effect is particularly strong in the Netherlands, where the probability to 
be  in  poverty  when  living  in  a  household  with  dependent  children  increases  by  5.2 
percentage points as compared to the baseline group.  The corresponding figures are also 
relatively large in Spain (2.0) and Italy (1.8). Having an unemployed (other than the 
household head) or a disabled member in the household also increases the chances of 
being in poverty in the Member States where the underlying odds ratio is significant. The 
effect is particularly strong in households with unemployed members in Italy and the 
Netherlands and in households disabled members in Ireland.  
 
In total, the second specification (Table 2) fits the data much better than the first 
specification  (Table  1),  since  both  the  Akaike  Information  Criterion  and  the  (AIK) 
Baysenian  Information  Criterion (BIC) decrease. Yet, as suggested by σα unobserved 
heterogeneity remains large and significant at the 0.1% level in all countries.
16  
 
According  to  Wooldridge  (2005,  p.  41),  when  applying  the  methodology 
described  in  section  5,  for  the  estimators  to  be  efficient,  all  time constant  and  time 
varying variables must be strictly exogenous. The strict exogeneity assumption means 
that since we control for the past poverty status and unobserved heterogeneity, current 
poverty status must be unrelated to the value of the regressors in past or future period. In 
other words, violation of the exogeneity assumption exists if there are feedback effects 
from poverty status to future values of the covariates included as regressors in the logit 
model. Individual characteristics such as age, gender and nationality cannot depend on 
past poverty status. This is also likely to apply for education, for the limited period of 
observation  used  here.  Nevertheless,  the  existence  of  past  poverty  spells  might 
theoretically  affect  the  employment  status,  fertility  decisions  (existence  of  dependent 
children in the household), employment and health status of household members. When 
                                                 
14 It should be noted that in the way that ECHP sample persons were selected, immigrants could only 
appear in the panel, if they were selected at the first wave or if they move in to a sample household in the 
next waves. Therefore, it can be alleged that ECHP does not measure properly population resulting from 
immigration inflows. 
15 This is in accordance with the results of Andriopoulou and Tsakloglou (2011), which show that, unlike 
the rest of the EU, ceteris paribus, in Denmark and Finland the chances of exiting poverty increase when 
dependent children are present into the household; an effect that can be attributed to the importance of 
family benefits in these countries.  
16 We have also run all specifications using a standard logit regression without controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity. It is interesting to note that although the odds ratio for the household and household head 
characteristics are slightly higher when unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled for, the odds for the 
state dependence are substantially higher while the odds for the initial conditions considerably lower. The 
results are available from the authors on request. 11 
 
examining feedback effects, Biewen (2004) finds that there is evidence that experiencing 
poverty has a negative effect on future employment behaviour and household cohesion. 
Specifically,  he  finds  that  poverty  experiences  may  be  associated  with  processes  of 
demoralization,  depreciation  of  human  capital  and  incentive  problems,  increasing  the 
probability that individuals who become poor will remain so for an extended period of 
time. At the same time, he identifies that low income strains marriages and cohabitative 
relationships. 
 
In  the  literature,  there  is  not  any  commonly  accepted  test  for  testing  the 
exogeneity  assumption.  In  Table  3,  the  variables  that  may  cause  endogeneity  were 
removed from the model. In total, six variables were excluded that are related to the 
employment  status  of  the  household  head  and  the  existence  of  dependent  children, 
unemployed  or  disabled  household  members.  Both  the  Akaike  Information  Criterion 
(Akaike  1973)  and  the  Baysenian  Information  Criterion  (Schwarz  1978)  decrease, 
suggesting  that  the  the  explanatory  power  of  the  model  deteriorated.  Moreover, 
unobserved heterogeneity increases, implying that the variables that were removed from 
the  specification  did  account  significantly  for  the  observed  heterogeneity  across 
individuals that explain differences in the probability of being poor. Despite the fact that 
a large number of variables were removed from the specification, when comparing the 
results of Table 2 and Table 3, in most cases we do not observe substantial differences in 
the estimates of the variables that are common in both specifications. Yet, in some cases 
the  differences  are  large;  for  example,  in  the  cases  of  young  headed  households  in 
Denmark and Finland, elderly households in Denmark and immigrant headed households 
in Spain (with EU citizenship) and immigrant headed with non EU citizenhip in France, 
Finland and Luxembourg. This indicates that the increase in the marginal effect absorbed 
by the remaining variables is not distributed proportionally in all cases and that there 
might  be  some  issues  of  endogeneity  for  specific  countries  that  cannot  be  easily 
examined at this context of analysis (for an approach examining feedback effects see 
Biewen 2009). 
 
Table 4 focuses on the role of household type on poverty. Various household type 
classifications have been tested in the regressions and the one finally chosen includes ten 
different household types: single adult aged less than 30; single adult aged from 30 to 64; 
single adult aged more than 64; couple only, where both members are aged less than 65; 
couple  only  with  at  least  one  household  member  aged  more  than  64;  other  type  of 
household  without  dependent  children  (e.g.  a  couple  with  working  children  living 
together, two brothers living together, three students living together, etc.); lone parent 
with at least one dependent child; couple with one or two dependent children; couple 
with  more  than  two  dependent  children;  other  type  of  household  with  at  least  one 
dependent child (e.g. a couple with two dependent children and one grant parent living 
together, two grandparents with a dependent grandchild, etc.). When the household type 
dummies are used, the age dummies for the household head and the dummy indicating 
whether  there  are  dependent  children  in  the  household  are  removed  from  the 
specification as they partly capture the same effect in an aggregate way. The baseline 
household is a couple without children and none of the household members is over 64 
years old.  The rest of the baseline group characteristics remain unchanged. 
 
In Table 4, the probability of being poor when belonging to the baseline group 
ranges from 0.7 in Luxembourg to 3.5 in Ireland and it is slightly higher for 10 out of 14 
countries and lower for 4 countries as compared to the corresponding estimates of Table 12 
 
2. Both the marginal effects for the initial and the lagged poverty status are high and 
significant suggesting that past poverty experience is a significant determinant of current 
poverty status irrespectively of the “amount” of observed and unobserved heterogeneity 
that we control for.  
 
Compared to the baseline household type, almost all other household types have 
higher probability to be in poverty with few exceptions. For instance single adults aged 
more than 64 in Spain and the Netherlands and the residual category “other household 
type without dependent children” in Ireland, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy are less 
likely  to  be  in  poverty  than  the  baseline  group.  With  regards  to  the  Mediterranean 
countries and Ireland, it should be noted that in this residual category belongs the family 
type  with  two  parents  and  adult  children  that  work  but  still  live  in  their  parents 
household,  which  is  very  common  in  these  Member States.  More  than  20%  of  the 
population  lives  in  such  households  in  the  Mediterranean  countries,  while  the 
corresponding  figure  is  around  10%  in  countries  like  the  Netherlands,  Finland  and 
Denmark. 
 
Living alone and being less than 30 years old sharply increases the risk of being 
poor in most countries. In Portugal the effect is negative ( 0.8), while in Spain, Greece, 
Ireland and Luxembourg the effect is not statistically significant. On the contrary, in the 
Northern countries such as the Netherlands (28.9), Finland (16.1), Denmark (10.4) and 
the UK (9.8), the increase in the probability to be poor, when living alone and being less 
than 30  years old, is particularly high. Being a single adult aged 30 to 65  years old 
increases the chances of being poor as compared to the baseline group only in 7 out of 14 
countries and only in Ireland the marginal effect is greater than 2.0 percentage points. 
Also in Ireland, single adults aged more than 64 have significantly higher chances to be 
in  poverty  (9.4),  while  the  relevant  marginal  effect  ranges  from  1.0  to  1.9  in  the 
remaining countries where the effect is positive and significant. Netherlands is the only 
country where the effect is negative at the 5% level of significance. A couple with at least 
one member aged more than 64 has higher probability to be in poverty as compared to 
the baseline group in Greece (2.4), Austria (1.9), Denmark (1.9), Spain (1.1), Belgium 
(0.9), Portugal (0.8) and the UK (0.7); and statistically significantly lower probability but 
small  in  magnitude  in  Germany  ( 0.3)  and  France  ( 0.3).  As  already  mentioned  the 
residual type of household without dependent children gives negative marginal effects in 
a substantial number of countries and only in the Netherlands (4.4) and Denmark (1.7), 
the chances to be under the poverty line are higher when living in such a household. 
 
In  accordance  with  the  previous  results,  all  household  types  with  dependent 
children have higher chances to be in poverty than the baseline group. The higher risk is 
found in lone parent families and families with more than two children. In particular, 
lone parent families have a substantially higher risk to be in poverty as compared to the 
baseline group in the Netherlands (18.3), the UK (8.4), Germany (4.6) and France (3.9), 
while families with more than two children have much higher probability to be under the 
poverty threshold in the Netherlands (11.6), Spain (6.1), Luxembourg (5.1), the UK (4.7) 
and Italy (4.4). It should be mentioned, though, that the share of the population belonging 
to this household type differs a lot across countries, varying from 5.4% in Greece to 
20.3% in Ireland. 
 
The estimates for the variables that are common in the second and the fourth 
specification  are  similar  in  magnitude  and  significance.  Both  the  AIC  and  the  BIC 13 
 
decline, as well as the  measures of unobserved heterogeneity  suggest that this, more 
detailed, specification explains in a better way the probability to be in poverty in all 
countries examined.  
 
For each value of the predictor in period j there is a postulated value of the logit 
hazard. In Table 5, the impact of past poverty experience (initial and in the previous year) 
on the conditional probability of being in poverty is estimated using the first specification 
with and without controls for unobserved heterogeneity. Table 6 reports estimates of the 
impact  of  state  dependence  on  the  conditional  probability  of  being  in  poverty  now 
averaged  over  the  other  covariates  using  the  fourth  specification.  The  estimated 
probabilities reveal that when we do not control for unobserved heterogeneity the effect 
of poverty in the previous year is much stronger than the effect of the initial poverty 
status. When unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for, the result is reversed. 
 
The probabilities in both parts of Table 5 correspond to four combinations of past 
poverty status. In the first line, the probability that an individual experiences poverty is 
estimated,  when  he/she  is  non poor  in  both  the  initial  and  the  previous  year.  When 
unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, the probability to be in poverty in period 
t, while being non poor in the initial year and in t 1 declines by half in most Member 
States. If the individual experienced poverty in the past, either in the previous or initial 
year, the probability to be below the poverty line in t increases as compared to the initial 
combination (non poor in the initial period, non poor in t 1). When we do not control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, the effect of experiencing poverty in the previous but not in 
the initial year (line two) is much stronger than the effect of experiencing poverty in the 
initial  year  only  (line  three).  The  estimated  probabilities  are  higher  than  40%  in  all 
Member States  for  the  second  combination  (non poor  in  the  initial  year,  poor  in  the 
previous year,), while for the third combination (poor in the initial year, non poor in the 
previous year), the probabilities range from 9.1% in the Netherlands to 23.2% in Greece. 
Yet, this result is reversed in almost all countries, in Part B of Table 5, where unobserved 
heterogeneity is controlled for (the exceptions being Finland and the Netherlands). The 
estimated probabilities for the second combination range from 9.9% in Belgium to 36.4% 
in Finland, while for the third combination the estimated probabilities increase and range 
from 10.7% in Germany to 43.7% in Greece. Finally, the individuals that experienced 
poverty in both the initial and the previous year have the highest probabilities to be in 
poverty in t with or without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. In the first case, 
the estimated probabilities range from 64.6% in the Netherlands to 81.4% in Portugal and 
in the second case from 53.1% in the Netherlands to 80.3% in Portugal.  
 
Table 6 estimates the corresponding probabilities using the fourth specification 
and, thus, a more “favourable” (with regards to poverty status) baseline group. In general, 
all estimated probabilities are lower than in the previous table. More specifically, Part A 
of Table 6 (without controls for unobserved heterogeneity) reveals that the probability of 
being  poor  in  t  while  being  non poor  in  both  the  initial  year  of  the  survey  and  the 
previous year ranges from 1.1% in Luxembourg to 4.8% in Ireland. When the individual 
is  non poor  in  the  initial  year,  but  poor  in  the  previous  year  (combination  2),  the 
probability of being poor in t increases sharply and ranges from 11.6% in Denmark to 
31.1% in the Netherlands. In all countries, the estimated probabilities reported in the 
third line of the panel, when the individual appears to be poor in the initial year but non 
poor in the previous year are substantially lower that the probabilities reported in the 
second line (they range between 3.6% and 10.6%). Finally, when both the initial and 14 
 
lagged poverty values are set to 1, the estimated probability of being poor ranges from 
24.2% in Denmark to 63.0% in Ireland. In line with the results of the first specification 
that are reported in Table 5, when observed heterogeneity is controlled for (Part B of 
Table 6), the estimated  probabilities as well as  the differences  across  Member States 
decline. The probability of being poor in t, while being non poor in the initial year of the 
survey and in the year t 1 is everywhere very low and ranges between 0.3% and 2.8%. In 
other words, individual unobserved characteristics “absorb” part of the  differences in 
predicted probabilities across Member States. The probability of being poor in t, while 
being non poor in the initial year, but poor in the previous year is now much lower than 
in Panel A (ranging from 1.5% in Luxembourg to 12.2% in Ireland) and lower than the 
corresponding probabilities of being poor in the initial year and non poor in the previous 
year (with the exceptions of Ireland and the UK). Finally, the probabilities of being poor 
in t, while being poor both in the initial year and in the year t 1 are on average fifteen 
percentage points than the probabilities without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. 
The  lowest  value  is  reported  in  Luxembourg  (18.2%) the  highest  in  the  Netherlands 
(45.0%).  
 
The general conclusion to be drawn from these two tables is that, ceteris paribus, 
the probability of being in poverty now is higher for individuals that have experienced 
poverty in the past both with or without unobserved heterogeneity. When unobserved 
heterogeneity is added in the regression, the estimated probabilities decline and the effect 
of being poor only in the initial year (not the previous year) is higher than the effect of 
being poor only in the previous year (not the initial year).  
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
The aim of this paper was to study the dynamics of poverty and in particular 
whether past poverty experience affects current poverty status. Our main conclusion is 
that state dependence remains significant in all specifications, even when controlling for 
observed, unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions. Consequently, social benefits 
are likely to play an important role if breaking the “vicious circle” of poverty is among 
the long run policy objectives of the policy makers.  
 
We  also  find  that  the  coefficient  of  initial  poverty  status  is  significant  in  all 
specifications and when we control for unobserved heterogeneity the magnitude of the 
coefficient is higher than the magnitude of the coefficient of lagged poverty status. This 
indicates that an early intervention is necessary. As Finnie (2000) underlines, given the 
state  dependence  and  the  intergenerational  effect  that  poverty  often  has,  an  early 
intervention offers the maximum of benefits to the poor households and society, because 
there are greater chances for an early than a late intervention to have long lasting effects. 
 
Irrespective  of  the  magnitude  of  state  dependence,  unobserved  heterogeneity 
remains also important in all specifications and its magnitude (as captured by sigma_a) 
does not decrease substantially as the specification of the model improves. Moreover, the 
results for the observed characteristics indicate that individual heterogeneity also affects 
current poverty status. Consequently, anti poverty policies should include schemes such 
as education, development of personal skills and capacities or other labour market and 
social  policies.  It  is  also  important  to  note  that having  an  income  over  or  under  the 
poverty  line  and,  thus,  being  characterised  as  “poor”  or  “non poor”  is  not  directly 
observable by the individuals concerned (contrary to the unemployment situation) and 15 
 
may not affect the behaviour and choices of persons and families as strong as it would be 
necessary  for  escaping  from  poverty.  Providing  appropriate  incentives  for  the  poor 
people to work harder, take advantage of opportunities and exploit life chances might 
also be necessary. 
 
To  conclude,  the  empirical  results  of  this  paper  indicate  that  both  state 
dependence  and individual heterogeneity (observed or unobserved) play  an important 
role in keeping individuals into poverty. Consequently, there is no single path into or out 
of poverty, suggesting that multiple policies can be considered to help people getting out 
of poverty. Given that the education and development of personal skills is a long run 
process,  which  is  also  related  to  household  income  levels,  the  importance  of  the 
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